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ABSTRACT 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) are changing the way 
people learn, do business, build relationships, and manage their lives. ICT allow 
easy and continuous access to open source intelligence (OSINT) that acts as 
force multipliers, enabling civilians to find new and more effective ways to 
participate in civil society and address disempowering strategies implemented by 
governments around the world to maintain stability. ICT and OSINT cultivate fluid 
intelligence and adaptive governance and can act as a catalyst to cultivate these 
capacities to transform conflict. The research question sought to determine 
whether fluid intelligence (cognitive ability to adapt and innovate) and adaptive 
governance (leadership and systems that work together with the governed to 
create favorable outcomes) are correlated with stability in gulf monarchies in the 
Middle East. This thesis examined the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the State of 
Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the Kingdom of Bahrain, the State of 
Kuwait, and the Sultanate of Oman using a complex adaptive systems analytic 
framework that drew upon the theories of adaptive governance and fluid and 
crystallized intelligence. Group grievance often indicates levels of stability in 
civilian populations. This study revealed a strong correlation between adaptive 
regimes with fluid populations and stability. Populations high in fluid intelligence 
in adaptive monarchical regimes had lower group grievance, but populations high 
in fluid intelligence in non-adaptive monarchical regimes had higher group 
grievance.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Arab Spring of 2011 was a succession of civilian revolts that spread 
throughout the Middle East (Anderson, 2011). Populations rose against 
governments that refused, or lacked the capacity, to make the changes needed 
to implement much-needed social, cultural, and economic reform.  Arab Spring 
incidents took place throughout the Middle East, including all six of the gulf 
monarchies. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the State of Qatar, the Kingdom of 
Bahrain, the State of Kuwait, and the Sultanate of Oman all experienced 
incidents of population unrest at different degrees and for diverse reasons. 
According to Forstenlechner, Rutledge, and Alnuaimi (2017), two main 
assumptions have circulated in academia about why the gulf monarchies did not 
collapse under protest during the Arab Spring, including the fact that “monarchies 
are based on tribal, clan and family allegiances” (para. 1) and social contracts 
that have met the populations’ basic needs. Forstenlechner et al. also made it 
clear that none of the gulf monarchies “face a crisis of legitimacy” (para. 1). The 
following study used a data centric interdisciplinary approach to test these 
assumptions and discover if there is a strong correlation between populations 
high in fluid intelligence in adaptive regimes and stability in Middle Eastern gulf 
monarchies. 
2 
A Civilian Perspective 
The perspectives of civilian populations can be explored by insightfully 
observing the nature of decentralized, aggregate, informal communities in the 
region. Bayat (2013) asserted that subtle nuances in Middle Eastern civil society 
in the months preceding the Arab Spring indicated a climate ripe for protest, but 
were overlooked because observers failed to recognize the new signs of the 
times.  
In monarchies, levels of trust among the population in the form of goodwill 
(or social capital) serve as a mechanism to share and promote social, economic 
and political interests. Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) are 
mechanisms these populations use to engage with and diffuse ideas in the local, 
national, and international sphere. The governed in gulf monarchies participate 
indirectly in the decision-making process (with the exception of Kuwait, which 
operates under a parliamentary system). Citizen participation through 
collaboration is a powerful force that drives the implementation of sound policy in 
civil society, “creating opportunities for citizens to lead healthy and productive 
lives” (National Democratic Institute, 2018, para. 1). However, in the gulf 
monarchies, direct citizen participation through traditional democratic 
mechanisms is among the lowest in the Middle East (Bertelsmann, 2017).  
Interest Groups 
Economic and non-economic interest groups drive social movements and 
influence the decision-making process. An interest group is “an organization 
whose members share common concerns, and try to influence government 
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policies that impact those concerns” (Cliffs Notes, 2016, para. 1). Economic 
interest groups share and promote business interests whereas non-economic 
interest groups can be religious, single interest, cultural, or ideological (Cliffs 
Notes, 2016). The form and function of the interest group (e.g., economic or non-
economic) working within a specific type of governing system (e.g., democracy or 
monarchy) work together differently to influence its impact on the development 
and implementation of policy in the interests of the private sector or community-
at-large. These formal groups use ICT to attract others and promote their 
agendas. 
Information and Communication Technologies, Social Change,  
and Open Source Intelligence 
ICT have permeated government institutions and civilian populations alike. 
These new technologies carry and diffuse communications in a consistent and 
systematic fashion.  
Customer management systems (CMS), websites, blogs, smart phones, 
social media platforms, search engines, podcasts and television 
broadcasts are examples of passive and active ICT mechanisms that 
facilitate the effective delivery of personal messages, public opinions, 
ideas, facts and diverse worldviews. (Rouse, 2017, para. 3) 
Data and information that are available to the public are generally classified as 
open source. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA, 2010) defines open source 
as “publicly available information including the internet, television, radio, 
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newspapers, magazines, specialized journals, conference proceedings, think 
tank studies, photos and geospatial information” (para. 3). 
Open source information “legally and ethically derived from public 
sources” (Steele, 1997, p. 329) and specifically tailored to satisfy or support a 
specific objective is often defined as open source intelligence (OSINT). The 
terms OSINT and open source information are often used interchangeably in 
both the public and private sector. Regardless of how it is referenced, this easily 
accessible, ubiquitous, and highly impressionable immersion of diverse 
messages and media is changing the way that populations perceive and respond 
to adaptive and non-adaptive governments.  
OSINT driven by ICT have changed the way human beings think, interact, 
and manage their daily lives. “The more recent developments of the internet and 
worldwide web have created new roles for human-computer symbiosis in human 
computer relationships, actually augmenting human intelligence in dynamic 
problem solving” (Glassman & Kang, 2012, p. 675) by the constant use of 
OSINT. ICT and the internet are both mechanisms and media. ICT are used to 
deliver OSINT to the end user and the internet is used as a form of media to 
access and diffuse diverse ICT and OSINT to the end user. ICT are useless 
without information to share, just as a printer by itself is of no utility without ink.  
When gathered, developed and shared on social networking platforms like 
Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube, OSINT allow anyone with an internet 
connection to express who they are, what they stand for, and points of pain 
affecting the quality of their lives.  
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As work becomes more technologically specialized and interrelated with 
the global village, and as associations with a wider range of individuals 
make social life more complex, “reality” is more to be perceived in the 
abstract, more to be pieced together in mental processes. (1988, Fisher, 
p. 133) 
Individuals and groups globally discover commonalities and differences through 
the systematic exchange of ideas. OSINT distributed through ICT channels 
contribute to the development of fluid intelligence (innovation and interdisciplinary 
thinking) that affect how individuals and groups manage expectations both 
domestically and abroad. These connections also reveal how networks of 
individuals express discontent and solve problems. 
Non-Adaptive Governance 
The challenge of unstable, volatile civilian populations in high risk regions 
has been historically addressed using strategies of coercion, intimidation, and 
subjugation that include using the word “terrorist and terrorism” out of context, 
“smear campaigns, threats, travel bans, harassment, fines, arrests and 
imprisonment” to keep hot political climates from erupting into devastating 
governmental forest fires (Civicus, 2018, p.15). In the past, these practices have 
sustained dictatorships and authoritarian regimes, and sanctions or interventions 
imposed by the international community have not improved the lives of 
populations affected by them. The complexity of interdependent relationships and 
OSINT developed and nurtured between and within state and non-state actors 
has changed the calculus of perceptions and responses to exogenous control 
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tactics. From 2010-2016 mass reformation movements, and terrorist incidents 
have checkered the global landscape on increasing scales.  
The National Intelligence Council (NIC, 2012) revealed “megatrends, 
game changers and potential worlds” (p. ii) that are likely to have the greatest 
effect on international security by the year 2030. From those three categories, 
key indicators within each that have direct or indirect ties to ICT and OSINT in 
the context of adaptive governing systems include “individual empowerment; 
diffusion of power; demographic patterns; the governance gap; the impact of new 
technologies and a non-state world” (p. ii). Of the comprehensive list of trends, 
frameworks, and alternative worlds, none addressed how the interaction effects 
from fundamental cognitive paradigm shifts and the degree of adaptability of 
governing systems will impact stability and international security in the years to 
come. In the context of this research study, the identification of these 
endogenous and exogenous indicators among and within the Middle Eastern gulf 
monarchies can inform bottom-up, local-level preventive strategies that 
contribute to stability and growth in the Middle East through adaptive 
collaborative governance. 
What is Fluid and Crystallized intelligence? 
The theory of fluid intelligence (or Gf) and crystallized intelligence (or Gc) 
explains how human beings perceive, process, and respond to internal and 
external stimuli (Kyllonen & Kell, 2017). It seeks to describe the static and 
dynamic schemata that drive and form human intellect. Crystallized intelligence 
indicates the capacity to make sense of data from a static framework (like 
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learning a new language or relying on experience to inform decisions), whereas 
fluid intelligence indicates a capacity to use static frameworks in diverse contexts 
and solve novel, complex problems (Kyllonen & Kell, 2017).  
A research study conducted by Glassman and Kang (2011) concluded 
that individuals have evolved to favor more adaptive or fluid ideas and responses 
to unfavorable conditions in adult populations. This is already a natural 
characteristic of youth populations. The age of ICT has ushered in constant 
exposure to and dissemination of OSINT, which has, over time, changed the 
nature of neural networks in the brain, changing the lens by which people see the 
world and the mechanisms individuals and groups use to express needs and 
enhance their ability to meet those needs. This thesis argues that these cognitive 
changes are germane to the extent that non-state actors might respond to 
adaptive or non-adaptive governing systems based on thresholds that instigate 
climates of conflict or progressive reform.  
Fluid intelligence alone is not adequate to determine these thresholds, as 
gaps in the expectations of civilian populations largely hinge on the degree of 
adaptability of governing systems and baseline level needs within the population.  
States with some of the highest levels of internet usage (such as Bahrain 
with 88% of its population online, a level higher than that of the United 
States) and states with some of the lowest levels of internet exposure (like 
Yemen and Libya) both experienced mass protests. (Stepanova, 2011, 
p. 3).  
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In complex adaptive systems, combinations of variables can produce completely 
different outcomes. A more accurate measure of thresholds within a particular 
state based on both the government and the governed would better determine 
the nature of the interactions between populations engaged in internet and ICT 
usage (which cultivate fluid intelligence), the degree of adaptability of the 
governing system, and its influence on stability in the Middle East. 
Current Study 
The current study strove to investigate one primary issue: whether fluid 
intelligence through ICT and OSINT engagement in civilian populations with 
adaptive governments promote stability in gulf monarchies in the Middle East. 
Leaders in governments around the world have tapped into the power of ICT to 
influence public thought by shaping collective perspectives about policies and 
encouraging citizens to engage in the political process by keeping them informed 
of new ideas, initiatives, or opportunities to contribute to decisions that lead to 
progressive reform. Democracies, authoritarian governments, and monarchies 
navigate ICT and OSINT in different ways for different purposes. Most non-state 
actors are using ICT to leverage the power of timely, relevant, and practical 
OSINT to innovate and affect change.  
Local populations within Middle Eastern monarchies and the international 
community are not only using ICT as a tool in droves, but also evolving through 
“human computer symbiosis” (Glassman & Kang, 2012, p. 674). This evolution of 
internal cognitive “capacities of resilience” to traditional forms of aggressive 
governmental interventions and population control are changing the ways that 
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civilian populations in gulf monarchies respond to conflict in adaptive and non-
adaptive regimes. In the same way an adult’s immune system can resist a 
medication that may have worked effectively in the past due to the body’s ability 
to develop antibodies against it, individuals and groups are growing more socially 
and cognitively resilient to calculated strategies of disempowerment and 
subjugation in non-adaptive governing systems.  
It is important to note that emergent outcomes in complex social systems 
can range from high to low probability and are intermittent and often high impact 
events. The fluid intelligence inherent in populations can be used to develop 
communities where quality of life expectations are consistently exceeded, or it 
can support the proliferation of regional and international incidents from groups 
and individuals who tap into their fluid capacity to promote violence, instability, 
and unrest. 
In a tectonic shift, individuals and small groups will have greater access to 
lethal and disruptive technologies (particularly precision-strike capabilities, 
cyber instruments, and bioterror weaponry), enabling them to perpetrate 
large-scale violence—a capability formerly the monopoly of states. (NIC, 
2012, p. 9) 
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Thesis Organization 
The following sections of this thesis explore the existing body of research 
on adaptive governance, the nature of monarchies, and fluid/crystallized 
intelligence theories. They also present the methods used to create and analyze 
the dataset, the results of the analysis, a discussion of those results, and a 
conclusion.  
Chapter Two summarizes the complex systems framework (Homer-Dixon, 
1996); adaptive governance (Brunner, Steelman, Coe-Juell, Cromley, Edwards & 
Tucker, 2005; Folke, Hahn, Olsson & Norberg, 2005; Karpouzoglou, Dewolf & 
Clark, 2015); the form and function of absolute, constitutional and federation 
monarchies in the Gulf (PBS, 2018); and ICT’s impact on fluid and crystallized 
intelligence on national innovation systems, research, and development in gulf 
monarchies (Cattell & Horn, 1978; Glassman & Kang, 2012; Kyllonen & Kell, 
2017; Wiseman & Anderson, 2012).  After that, the literature review continues to 
build upon concepts from environmental psychology such as the ecology of 
human environment transactions (Stokols & Montero, 2002); the strategic uses of 
power structures and cultural identity networks that affect group and individual 
behavior (Romic, 2013); individual empowerment (Kieffer, 1984; Sadan, 2004); 
and the relationship between adaptive collaborative governance and self-
organized, sustainable communities (Folke, Hahn, Olsson & Norberg, 2005; 
McDougall & Banjad, 2015).  
Chapter Three describes the methods used to conduct a complex 
comparative analysis to test whether fluid intelligence and adaptive governance 
contribute to stability in gulf monarchies. The analytic process used a case study 
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research approach, process tracing, and the Periploko Method (a system 
designed to standardize data from diverse sets and measure interactions among 
concepts, dimensions, and data) to establish patterns and trends of correlation 
through abductive, deductive, and inductive reasoning. Adaptive capacity, 
collaboration, scale, learning, and knowledge were introduced as key concepts 
driving the research (Folke, Hahn, Olsson, & Norberg, 2005). Patterns, trends, 
and impact within and between categories and states were analyzed using data 
from 2010-2016. 
Chapter Four presents the results of the comparative complex analysis 
using summaries, tables, charts, and graphs. The study revealed that fluid 
intelligence and adaptive governance do contribute to stability in gulf monarchies. 
However, highly fluid populations governed by non-adaptive regimes tend to be 
more unstable, as indicated by levels of group grievance. The degree to which 
governing systems could identify and collaboratively adapt to these highly 
charged populations to meet baseline quality of life expectations while 
maximizing citizen value was the ultimate tipping point between outcomes that 
hinged on stability (low group grievance) or unrest (high group grievance).  
Chapter Five discusses the results in the context of the existing body of 
research, the current case study analysis, outliers and inconsistencies, 
implications, research limitations, advancing the research, and policy 
recommendations. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the 
State of Qatar, the State of Kuwait, and the Sultanate of Oman have all 
experienced instability within their population due to the Arab Spring. Some of 
12 
these states are home to groups that have sponsored international and regional 
acts of terrorism. The United Arab Emirates maintained consistent levels of 
stability throughout the Arab Spring. The data results reveal patterns, trends, and 
characteristics that provide more depth into how levels of fluid intelligence and 
degree of government adaptivity can promote stability or foment dysfunctional 
expressions of discontent.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Generally, prior research has not integrated adaptive governance and fluid 
intelligence to examine stability in the Middle East. The integration of these 
theories and data can shed light on how a motley group of variables could have 
the capacity to affect regional and international security on a grassroots level. 
The research question sought to answer whether ICT and OSINT cultivated fluid 
intelligence (cognitive ability to adapt and innovate) and whether adaptive 
governance promoted stability in Middle Eastern monarchical regimes. 
Examining different theories from diverse disciplines can reveal latent, 
overlooked subtleties that could have a tremendous impact on the capabilities, 
strategic direction, occurrence, and evolution of stability in Middle Eastern gulf 
monarchies.  
The interaction between state governing systems and the residents within 
that state are considered complex adaptive systems (CAS). CAS are primarily 
driven by feedback mechanisms that determine the nature of the activity while 
perpetuating interactions within the system (Miller & Page, 2007). Thomas 
Homer-Dixon (1996) distinguished between additive models based on the 
scientific method and relational, interactive models. Frameworks based solely on 
inductive and deductive reasoning are additive, but abductive reasoning often 
requires consideration of relational factors: “A system with highly non-linear 
functions can exhibit unanticipated threshold effects and chaotic behavior in 
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response to small perturbations” (p. 8). Homer-Dixon (1999) asserted that many 
outcomes in complex systems often only manifest themselves “in complex 
interaction with other social and physical variables” (p. 93). Homer-Dixon (1996) 
argued that traditional approaches to solving complex political science research 
questions such as the “Rational Actor and Causal Relationship do not fully 
capture the breadth and scope of interactions and potential “emergent 
phenomena” that may develop within a given time frame given myriad variables 
and conditions” (p.8). Homer-Dixon’s approach to complex systems aims to 
understand the gap between what is and what is expected as opposed to solely 
examining independent variables’ direct effect on given dependent variables. 
Adaptive governance and fluid intelligence were analyzed to determine whether 
and how this combination of variables could substantially affect levels of stability 
within gulf monarchies in the Middle East. 
Types of Middle Eastern Gulf Monarchies 
Countries throughout the Middle East are generally governed by 
parliamentary republics, theocracies, and monarchies that have been collectively 
characterized by “nationalism, religion, social and economic concerns, anti-
colonialist sentiment, diverse ethnic identities and tribal loyalties” (PBS, 2002, 
para. 1).  There are eight monarchies in the Middle East: the six gulf regimes, 
and Morocco and Jordan. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is a collection 
Middle Eastern states in Arabia whose primary goal since the GCC’s founding 
has been to increase political and economic ties within the Middle Eastern region 
(Sikimic, 2014). Its founding members include the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the 
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Sultanate of Oman, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the State of Kuwait, the 
Kingdom of Bahrain, and the State of Qatar. Saudi Arabia is the largest country 
within the council with a population of 28,571,770 as of 2016, while Bahrain 
boasts a population of 1,410,942 as of 2016(CIA World Factbook, 2016). 
The Middle Eastern gulf monarchies in Arabia are classified as absolute, 
constitutional, or federations. Absolute monarchies were born from absolute 
political systems based on the “divine right of kings” theory that emphasized 
centralized and complete power ordained by God (Encyclopedia Britannica, 
2018, para. 4). A traditional absolute monarchy is characterized by a lack of 
checks and balances and authority granted to one dominant leader that usually 
earned the regime a negative reputation due to corrupt leadership (Encyclopedia 
Britannica, 2018). This naturally resulted in little to no citizen participation in 
populations under monarchical rule. Some monarchies considered and 
anticipated the needs of the population, whereas others neglected or failed to 
hear the voice of the governed.  
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Sultanate of Oman, and the State of 
Qatar are considered absolute monarchies, yet their religion, ethnic diversity and 
natural resource wealth set them apart from absolute monarchies in Europe. 
Nepotism, unemployment and civil inequities are challenges that are being 
addressed in modern reformation initiatives, but the biggest challenge of all is the 
fear of losing legitimacy and relevance in an age of technological advancement 
and individual empowerment (CIA World Factbook, 2016). 
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In constitutional monarchies, the king or queen is the head of state, but 
does not have legislative authority (Monarchies, 2018). The Kingdom of Bahrain 
and the State of Kuwait are constitutional monarchies (CIA, 2017). Power to 
make and implement laws is given to a parliament designed to represent the 
people, although hereditary monarchical rule is still the dominant influence on the 
system (Monarchies, 2018). There are stark differences in governance, 
transparency, and citizen participation between Bahrain and Kuwait, even though 
they have the same political systems. 
The UAE is governed by a federation of seven monarchial sheikhdoms 
governed by a President and Prime Minister. Their government is composed of 
an executive, legislative and judiciary branch and their legal systems are based 
on both sharia and civil law (World Atlas, 2017). Citizen participation is 
implemented by “consultation (shura),” “consensus in group decision making 
(ijma),” and “the use of a consultative assembly made up of elders and respected 
members of civil society “(majlis al-shura)” (Long, 2017, paras. 6-8).  
Adaptive Governance Theory 
Adaptive governance theory contributed to the research methodology by 
providing a theoretical lens “in line with the emergence of new modes of 
governing in which multiple actors are involved; interactions within and across 
state, private sector and civil society are key; and decisions require action across 
multiple states and levels” (Karpouzoglou, Dewolf & Clark, 2015, p. 1). 
Munaretto, Siciliano, Turvani (2014) argued that “government control and 
steering” (p. 73) are counterproductive in managing complex social-ecological 
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systems in the 21st century. Adaptive governance attempts to reduce uncertainty 
by integrating diverse perspectives, knowledge, and evidence to improve the 
quality of decision-making.  This complex analysis applies the general constructs 
inherent in adaptive governance to the dynamic that exists between the 
government and the governed within the gulf monarchies of the Middle East. 
Monarchies make decisions that are heavily influenced and implemented 
by the royal family without a significant consideration of external perspectives 
(constitutional democracies are more democratic by design than the others). The 
concepts of citizen participation and monarchical rule are historically diametrically 
opposed. The gulf monarchies are composed of homogenous decision-making 
bodies that have been challenged to keep pace with the governed to meet quality 
of life expectation gaps in a rapidly evolving, 21st century society. Some gulf 
monarchies within the Middle East have been more adept at navigating the civil 
landscape to accommodate civil expectations than others. The form of 
governance is just one piece of the stability puzzle. Monarchies that have 
integrated systems, policies, or initiatives designed to give more voice to the 
governed will fail to promote stability and sustainable communities without 
adaptive leadership and a nuanced understanding and consideration of their 
population’s expectations. 
Constitutional monarchies in the Gulf have systems that are designed to 
increase the capacity for citizen participation while maintaining the integrity of the 
regime, but each has implemented those systems with starkly different levels of 
impact. The Kingdom of Bahrain and the State of Kuwait are both constitutional 
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monarchies, but stability within each dramatically differ as “demographic 
pressures, human rights and law and group grievance” have affected political, 
social, and economic outcomes (The Fund for Peace, 2017, para. 1).   
The UAE is a federation of monarchies that has put a premium on 
consensus, citizen engagement, and progressive reform. This group of 
monarchies has a centralized government composed of executive, judicial, and 
legislative branches. The UAE are different from the other monarchies in that 
they rely on diverse pools of knowledge and perspectives from each individual 
emirate applied to the federation, have institutionalized mechanisms that gather 
and consider the needs of the governed, and frequently consider civil feedback in 
the decision-making process.  
The Evolution of Adaptive Cognitive States: Adaptive Governance  
and the Expectation Gap 
The interaction between these diverse governing systems and their 
respective populations has manifested environments with various thresholds 
conducive to meeting essential quality of life expectations in the Middle East. 
Quality of life is defined in this paper as “social, cultural and institutional support 
that lends itself to a sense of physical, emotional and psychological wellness” 
(Knoema: IMD World Talent Report, 2017, paras. 1-2). This concept is 
operationalized as a form of internal satisfaction with the way things are, 
buttressed by adaptive governance systems and meaningful social universes 
(Fisher, 1997) and catalyzed by fluid, adaptive cognitive states. The gap between 
fulfilled expectations and the cacophonous dissonance of hope deferred against 
19 
the backdrop of non-adaptive governing systems in the Middle East can create 
atmospheres ripe for conflict and instability.  
Adaptive governance emphasizes the interdependence of science, policy, 
and decision-making from an integrative perspective that encourages grassroots 
support in the decision-making process. This context of governance has been 
historically applied to manage and facilitate natural resource and other social 
ecological systems (Brunner et al., 2005). Karpouzoglou, Dewulf, and Clark 
(2015) categorized adaptive governing systems as characterized by adaptive 
capacity, collaboration, scaling, knowledge, and learning. The theory of adaptive 
governance is ideally suited to examine how monarchical governing systems in 
the gulf region can effectively accommodate civil cognitive and paradigm shifts to 
encourage stability in the Middle East. 
The Theory of Fluid and Crystallized intelligence 
The internet has given non-state actors access to a seemingly infinite 
scale of resources, knowledge, opportunities, and diverse perspectives that have 
changed the calculus of quality of life expectations throughout the world. OSINT 
disseminated through diverse ICT mechanisms have developed more fluid 
abilities in populations that enable them to respond more effectively to 
opportunity constraints, human rights abuses, and other strategies of subjugation 
by non-adaptive governing systems. Open government data sources have forced 
governing systems to adhere to higher standards of accountability and 
institutional responsiveness to the needs of civil society. Non-adaptive governing 
systems strongly regulate accessibility to government data to strategically control 
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population expectations and decrease transparency, which tends to cultivate 
corruption, further widening the gap between quality of life expectations and 
stability (Open Data Barometer, 2017). 
The theory of fluid and crystallized intelligence contributes to the overall 
research methodology by deepening an understanding of how fundamental 
cognitive capacities among populations in gulf monarchies have evolved to 
accommodate complex environments, diverse learning landscapes, and 
advanced technology. The ability to think ‘fluidly’ or to exercise fluid perspectives 
in diverse contexts is more common in young adults: “Younger humans 
(generally through mid-adolescence)….use a fluid intelligence to solve problems 
and navigate their local ecologies, but as they grow older, the crystallized habits 
of thought become more important in thinking processes” (Glassman & Kang, 
2012, p. 674). The lifespan of fluid intelligence has increased into adulthood 
(Glassman & Kang, 2012) and has manifested a cognitive adaptive resilience to 
traditional intimidation and subjugation tactics that disempower populations in 
attempts to promote stability. The value of individual citizens in terms of 
knowledge, innovation, and contribution has increased drastically in tandem with 
these capacities of adaptation and resilience. Paradigms that leverage this 
emergent citizen value can contribute to progressive and thriving monarchical 
regimes in the Middle East. Citizen value can be defined in terms of a 
sustainable empowerment quotient (innovative, social, cultural, holistic, and 
economic) that contributes to quality of life, longevity of the regime, and 
national/international security. 
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Wiseman and Anderson (2012) researched ICT-based learning as a 
catalyst for national innovation systems (NIS) and research and development 
innovation (RDI) in gulf monarchies to discover in what capacity “education was 
being used to advance sociopolitical and economic agendas” (p. 607). The 
researchers concluded that, collectively, the countries had a high capacity to 
contribute to progress in science and technology, yet have been hampered due 
to cultural constraints. Knowledge is used here in the context of both fluid and 
crystallized intelligence. Wiseman and Anderson asserted that “as individuals 
become creators of knowledge they are able to share and spread innovation” 
(p. 610). The researchers did not make it clear how knowledge affects another 
ability that supports the development of innovation: critical thinking in the form of 
fluid intelligence. In measuring capacity, Wiseman and Anderson categorized 
learning and knowledge (fluid and crystallized intelligence) as a single entity.  
Kyllonen and Kell (2017) contended that knowledge and learning are two 
very different outcomes, distinguishing them in the context of crystallized and 
fluid intelligence. Crystallized knowledge is “ability that reflects schooling and 
acculturated learning” whereas fluid intelligence reflects critical and adaptive 
thinking (p. 15).  This research study examined knowledge and learning in the 
context of crystallized and fluid intelligence. 
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The Influence of ICT on Individual Empowerment 
 
 
Figure 1. Information and communication technologies usage around the world, 
2010-2016. Source: World Economic Forum, Global Information Technology 
Report, Networked Readiness Index (NRI), 2017. Note. 1 = least engaged and 
7 = most engaged. 
 
The advent of the internet and ICT have facilitated a megatrend of 
individual empowerment that has given non-state actors the accessibility and 
scale (see Figures 1 and 2) to acquire knowledge, develop skills, and mobilize 
resources to achieve personal, professional, and political agendas (Glassman & 
Kang, 2011; National Intelligence Council, 2012).  Romic (2013) emphasized 
non-state actors’ use of “cyber power” and ICT to “facilitate novel means to 
23 
politically challenge the traditional nation state” (p. 99) and form ideational social 
networks that strongly influence group and individual behavior. Romic also 
asserted that “patterns of interdependence” (p. 94) and interactions between 
groups and individuals shape behavior.  
 
 
Figure 2. Internet usage in the Middle Eastern gulf monarchies (2010-2016). 
Source: International Telecommunications Union (ITU), 2017 
 
Sadan (2004) described individual empowerment as a “personal, intimate 
change process” (p. 13). This process involves interactions among people, the 
environment, and conditions. Individual empowerment is a capacity that enables 
tenacious, critical, and symbiotic engagement in self, family, and community to 
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affect change. Populations that are empowered have high levels of fluid 
intelligence (Kieffer, 1984; Sadan, 2004). 
Empowerment is an interactive process which occurs between the 
individual and his environment, in the course of which the sense of the self 
as worthless changes into an acceptance of the self as an assertive 
citizen with sociopolitical ability. The outcome of the process is skills, 
based on insights and abilities, the essential features of which are a 
critical political consciousness, an ability to participate with others, a 
capacity to cope with frustrations and to struggle for influence over the 
environment. (Kieffer, as cited in Sadan, 2004, p. 75) 
Shaping Minds and Political Outcomes Through Fluid Intelligence 
The worldwide web generates a wealth of knowledge that shapes 
perceptions, identities, and meaning in youth and adults alike. ICT and OSINT on 
the internet expose individuals and groups to ideas and ways of thinking that 
transcend social, cultural, and ethnic identities. Stokols & Montero (2002) 
asserted that human environment transactions are guided by two assumptions: 
that people’s relationships with their environments influence their wellbeing, and 
that they strive to enhance the “degree of fit between their own (or group’s) goals 
and needs” with the conditions of the environment (p. 661). ICT include personal 
computers, smart phones, social media, and electronic newsletter delivery 
services. OSINT includes information, data, and intelligence that is readily 
accessible and open to the public. Individuals and groups use ICT to produce 
and disseminate OSINT through multiple channels with an international reach. 
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Self-expression and a culture of self-actualization pervade social media venues, 
blog sites, and podcasts that are accessible to anyone with an internet 
connection and an open mind.  
Romic (2013) asserted that “new interactive technologies have provided a 
new and multi-leveled means for the construction of a given individual’s social 
identity” (p. 96). The strong human connections forged by the internet have 
cultivated an expansion of interdependent and complex networks of individuals 
that seek to complement the greater international community. These 
contemporary universes working in tandem with ICT and OSINT have resulted in 
fluid, adaptive cognitive paradigms resilient to fear-based tactics that seek to rob 
these individuals of their capacity to engage in citizen participation or sustainable 
community development and express their authentic voices. 
Fluid intelligence indicates the ability to solve complex problems in novel 
and diverse situations. This ability allows individuals to adapt cognitively in 
“unfamiliar domains using general reasoning processes” and has been shown to 
predict “criminality, civic participation and educational attainment” (Kyllonen & 
Kell, 2017, p. 16).  
The theory of fluid intelligence specifies that level of Gf in an individual is 
determined by the degree of complexity of relations in a hierarchy of 
relations that a person can insightfully respond to no matter what cultural 
domain the complexity exists or through whatever sensory input is 
presented. (Cattell & Horn, 1978, p. 141) 
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The more advanced an individual’s formal education, the higher the crystallized 
intelligence. Although crystallized intelligence and fluid intelligence can in many 
ways be interdependent, fluid intelligence is an ability that is developed by 
constant engagement, interaction and intellectual curiosity. If the capacity to 
exercise fluid thinking has not matured, crystallized intelligence will have little 
effect on fluid intelligence and will be the dominant mode of thinking (Kyllonen & 
Kell, 2017). 
Fluid intelligence is an ability that allows individuals and groups to use 
critical thinking skills and diverse learning opportunities to manifest paradigms 
that support changing and/or uncertain, complex environments. These complex 
environments and learning opportunities strengthen fluid intelligence. Abilities are 
“unobserved latent variables whose interrelationships cannot be accounted for by 
a general factor” (Kyllonen & Kell, 2017, p.17). In other words, they are a 
complex set of qualities that can give meaning to crystallized knowledge and 
experiences in diverse contexts. Fluid intelligence indicates an individual’s 
capacity to think critically from a variety of vantage points in a dynamic local, 
regional, and international landscape. Glassman and Kang (2011) contended 
that ICT and OSINT cultivate and strengthen fluid intelligence. 
OSINT has two main functions: gathering, encoding, and combining 
information to solve targeted problems, and increasing trust among users actively 
engaged in solving the problems (Glassman & Kang, 2012). International and 
independent civil service organizations have been historically integral in 
representing the interests and needs of non-state actors both regionally and 
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internationally and still play an essential role in promoting human rights, 
enhancing social protection, and sustaining cultural identities (Malit & Youha, 
2014). However, manifestations of individuals and social online communities that 
give voice to challenges inherent in non-adaptive governing systems have 
emerged and have been shown to be more effective from the bottom up, with 
OSINT and ICT driving and sustaining them. Glassman and Kang (2012) 
contended that sustained usage of ICT facilitates continuous exposure to OSINT 
and strengthens user tendencies towards adaptive cognition or fluid intellect. The 
researchers also noted that intellectual curiosity and creative insight in the face of 
seemingly insurmountable conditions are changing the way people respond to 
oppression and the solutions they devise to affect change.  
Motivation and Opportunity 
Kyllonen and Kell (2017) asserted that “Gf or (fluid intelligence) is invested 
in learning so that the rate of learning different tasks depends on Gf (along with 
motivation and opportunities to learn)” (p. 16).  Scale represented by internet 
access is a good measure of opportunity, and political preferences can indicate 
motivation in a given state. Drawing upon the concept of investment as 
motivation and opportunity, the more motivated civilians within a population are 
to participate in government and civil society (interest in politics and citizen 
participation), the more opportunities there are to learn in the context of diverse 
ICT and OSINT engagement, and the more engaged the population is in utilizing 
these technologies in everyday life, the more likely they are to make evolutionary 
contributions to civil society and government from a position of strength (or high 
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fluid intellect). This is a powerful dynamic in an adaptive governing system that 
responds to the needs of their population and is likely to result in favorable 
quality of life thresholds that meet expectations and make quality contributions to 
sustainable development.  
In non-adaptive governing systems, high motivation to engage in 
government and civil society, unlimited learning opportunities, and fluid 
intelligence can lead to contributions from a position of fluid strength, but on the 
defense. For instance, one might argue that in a non-adaptive regime, the more 
motivated one is to contribute to civil society with higher levels of governmental 
constraint and the same opportunities of those highly motivated (with high levels 
of fluid intelligence) in adaptive regimes, may be more inclined to resort to 
dysfunctional and destructive coping mechanisms (e.g., extremist behavior).  
In non-adaptive regimes, individuals and groups are likely to spend 
massive amounts of time and energy engaging ICT and OSINT to come up with 
destructive—albeit creative—ways to create organizations, systems, and 
networks that can fulfill unmet quality of life expectations (e.g., the creation of 
and sustenance of caliphates and other extremist groups). It may also be the 
case that civilians engage in innovative reformation tactics that can incrementally 
result in progressive change. Both are moderated by motivation, levels of 
dissatisfaction, and trust; resources; and as type and degree of OSINT exposure. 
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Adaptive Governance and Citizen Participation:  
Building Cognitive and Civil Resilience 
The interaction effects of adaptive governance, ICT, and OSINT play an 
integral role in building adaptive cognitive resilience in populations within Middle 
Eastern gulf monarchies. In the past, the gulf monarchies have created and 
implemented legislation that has repressed freedom of speech (both on and 
offline) and violated human rights (Global Voices, 2017). Since then, many tools 
have been developed to assess human development, economics, and corruption 
within in the global community. CIVICUS is a global civil science alliance that 
created an index that assesses civil freedom on a continuum that reflects open, 
narrowed, obstructed, repressed, and closed societies (CIVICUS Monitor, 2017). 
CIVICUS has categorized the gulf region of the Middle East as obstructed and 
repressed. 
In CAS, actors and governing systems rely on the interaction and 
feedback of endogenous and exogenous variables like institutions, organizations, 
systems, and networks for development and longevity.  A realization of the 
weight and impact of this concept can lead to strategies that lead to sustainable 
communities, conflict transformation, and long-term stability, as opposed to 
antiquated fear-based tactics that promote subjugation, disempowerment, and 
communal stagnation.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
METHODS 
 
 
A dataset was created from five diverse sources to analyze patterns, 
trends, interactions, and emergent outcomes using an interdisciplinary, 
multivariate approach. The dataset was first analyzed using process tracing to 
determine the most relevant and robust independent and dependent variables 
from which to draw conclusions. The variables were categorized by concept, 
operational concept, dimensions, and data. Separate analyses were conducted 
using a proprietary method to standardize measures across datasets and 
quantify interactions, patterns, and trends between variables. This method, 
referred to in the study as Periploko (which means complexity in Greek), enabled 
a more nuanced and standardized comparison of scores between operational 
concepts, dimensions, and data, enabling a general measurement of the 
interactions or impact of a variable or combination of variables by state.  
Key concepts included “adaptive capacity, collaboration, scale, learning 
and knowledge” (Karpouzoglou et al., 2015, p.1). Operational concepts identified 
included state fragility, political and social integration, ICT usage, and higher 
education and training. Dimensions of state fragility included cohesion, 
economic, and political components. The base level data itself represented each 
concept with different levels of impact. The data analyzed in the study included 
group grievance, uneven economic development, state legitimacy, human rights 
and the rule of law, social capital, interest groups, party systems, internet usage, 
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virtual social network engagement, and secondary/tertiary education enrollment 
(see Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3. Variable explanation. Adapted from Fragile States Index, Bertelsmann 
Index; World Economic Forum Global Competition Index; World Economic Forum 
Networked Readiness Index; International Telecommunications Union; 
Karpouzoglou, T., Dewulf, A., & Clark, J. (2016); Bichler, Gisela (2018)  
 
 The combination of learning, collaboration, and scale make up a process 
that leads to fluid intelligence; higher education and training are representative of 
knowledge; and adaptive capacity is a higher-level concept that characterizes 
adaptive governance (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 4. Tracing the process of adaptive governance, fluid, and crystallized 
intelligence. Adapted from Cattell & Horn, 1978; Karpouzoglou, T., Dewulf, A., & 
Clark, J. (2016) 
From a more granular, operational/data perspective, fluid intelligence was 
measured by virtual social network engagement, political and social integration, 
and internet usage respectively; knowledge was a measure of higher education 
training; and adaptive capacity was determined by state fragility data. 
Quantitative results from the operational data analysis were compared and 
contrasted with qualitative research gleaned from case studies of government 
and population activity within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the State of Kuwait, 
the Sultanate of Oman, the UAE, the Kingdom of Bahrain, and the State of Qatar. 
The effects of emergent outcomes based on the interaction of various 
combinations of variables were analyzed to identify degrees of impact in diverse 
contexts. It was necessary to isolate the most non-adaptive and adaptive states 
as well as states with the highest levels of fluid intelligence with the most 
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effective measure of stability in order to answer the research question 
successfully. Once these states emerged, concepts, operational concepts, 
dimensions, and data were used to assess strengths, weaknesses, similarities, 
and differences to guide a complex comparative case study analysis on each 
state and/or group of states.  
Data Sources 
The overall dataset was derived from five datasets: Fragile States Index 
(FSI), Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI), the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU), the World Economic Forum Global Information 
Technology Report, and the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness 
Index. The dataset was divided into concepts, operational concepts, dimensions, 
and data. Not all operational concepts had accompanying dimensions and only 
the most relevant dimensions and data were included. 
The FSI was developed by the Fund for Peace and based on a conflict 
assessment framework known as CAST, which “measures vulnerability in pre-
conflict, active conflict and post conflict situations” (Fragile States Index 
Methodology, 2018, p. 4). FSI measures fragility in four areas: “cohesion, 
economics, politics and society” (FSI Methodology, 2018, p. 4). It also uses more 
disaggregate data categories to separate fragility into its component parts. For 
instance, the data for cohesion include “security apparatus, factionalized elites 
and group grievance;” economics is made up of “economic decline, uneven 
economic development and human flight and brain drain;” “state legitimacy, 
public services, human rights and rule of law” represent politics; and 
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“demographic pressures, refugees and IDPs and external intervention” are the 
social factors (FSI Indicators, 2018, para. 3). 
The BTI (2017) publishes a “transformation index” (para. 1) that measures 
state propensities for democracy. para. In the BTI dataset, sovereign states that 
did not have fully developed democracies with populations over 2 million were 
chosen for analysis. The operational variables used to measure the state of 
democracies included: “stateness, political participation, rule of law, stability of 
democratic institutions and political and social integration” (BTI Codebook, 2016, 
para. 14). Political and social integration were used in the study to represent 
collaboration. Political and social integration included four granular data 
categories: “party system, interest groups, approval of democracy and social 
capital” (BTI Codebook, 2016, p. 23).  Social capital was later identified as a 
more representative indicator of collaboration as illustrated in Phase 4 of the 
results. 
The ITU (2017) is a United Nations specialized agency for ICT. ITU’s main 
goal is to promote consensus between the public and private sectors to advance 
the ICT industry. ICT included “fixed telephone lines, mobile cellular 
subscriptions, fixed broadband subscriptions and individuals using the internet” 
(Key Global ICT Indicators from ITU, 2017 para. 1). Internet usage in gulf 
monarchies was measured using this dataset. 
The World Economic Forum publishes a Global Information Technology 
Report that established the Networked Readiness Index (NRI). The NRI is a tool 
that assesses state readiness to take advantage of the ubiquitous opportunities 
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and resources available on the net to determine how economies maximize 
information communication technologies (NRI Codebook, 2017). This index 
measures drivers and impacts which are broken down into three sub-indexes: 
“the environment, usage and readiness” (NRI Codebook, 2017, p. xi). Data were 
gleaned from the United Nations (UN), United Nations Education, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO), World Bank, and the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) to form the comprehensive index. Virtual 
network usage data was measured from this set to represent ICT usage and 
learning. 
The World Economic Forum (2016-2017) also publishes a Global 
Competitive Index (GCI) every year to assess state productivity and 
competitiveness in the international market. The index includes three sub-
indexes: “basic requirements, efficiency enhancers and innovation and 
sophistication factors” (Global Competitive Index, 2017, p. 12). These sub-
indexes include indicators and criteria (or pillars) in each section. Basic 
requirements are composed of four pillars, including “institutions, infrastructure, 
macroenvironment and health and primary education” (GCI, 2017, p. 12). 
Efficiency enhancers have six pillars: “higher education and training, goods 
market efficiency, labor market efficiency, financial market development, 
technological readiness and market size” (GCI, 2017, p. 12). Finally, innovation 
and sophistication factors include measures of business and creative 
transformation (GCI, 2017, p.12). The fifth pillar, higher education, was chosen 
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from this dataset as a measure of secondary and tertiary education, or 
knowledge/crystallized intelligence. 
Five Key Concepts Used in the Study 
Adaptive Capacity 
Piplas (2012) defined adaptive capacity as “flexibility that allows a better 
adjustment to new contexts and changing conditions in terms of behavior, values 
and orientations” (p. 3). The Fund for Peace developed an index assessing 
government fragility. The operational concepts in their dataset are categorized as 
“cohesion, economic, political and social” and are based on a conflict 
assessment framework originally designed to measure a state’s vulnerability to 
collapse (The Fragile States Index, 2017, para. 2). I used the FSI to examine the 
following data—“group grievance, uneven economic development, state 
legitimacy and human rights”—in each of the gulf monarchies from 2007-2017 
(FSI Indicators, 2017, para. 3). The Country Dashboard and other interactive 
functions on the website supported a comprehensive comparative exploration. 
Collaboration 
Political and social integration can reveal patterns of collaboration 
between governments and the governed. The Bertelsmann Transformation Index 
generally measures political and economic transformation and transformation 
management using the dimensions of “stateness, political participation, rule of 
law, stability of democratic institutions and political and social integration” 
(Bertelsmanns Codebook, 2016, p. 23). This index “analyzes and evaluates 
whether and how developing countries and countries in transition are steering 
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social change toward democracy and a market economy” (Bertelsmann, 2018, 
para. 1). Measures of collaboration were cross referenced to gauge levels of civil 
engagement in isolation and compared to other gulf monarchies. 
Scale 
Scale represents scope in this analysis. The Cambridge Dictionary (2018) 
defined scope as “the opportunity for activity or a range in consideration of a 
particular subject” (para. 1). Scale can refer to the range of learning opportunities 
and diverse mechanisms for the transference of OSINT. Internet usage derived 
from the ITU dataset was used to measure scale. 
Learning 
Learning was first assessed as a function of virtual social network 
engagement. Levels of ICT engagement assume equal levels of exposure to 
OSINT as ICT are mechanisms by which the media, OSINT are shared. In other 
words, ICT are tools and platforms that carry the information to the end user. The 
internet contains OSINT and ICT from all over the world, accessible to most 
individuals throughout the world at different degrees. The data from the NRI were 
used to assess virtual social network usage in gulf monarchical regimes. The 
degree of ICT engagement personified by virtual social network engagement (or 
learning), indicated the level of opportunities, diverse mechanisms, and exposure 
to OSINT with which a citizen can engage to develop fluid intelligence. 
Knowledge 
Learning is dynamic, but knowledge is static. Crystallized intelligence is a 
measure of structured knowledge from which one can draw that has been 
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calcified into worldviews or memory based on experience and/or formal 
education (Cattell & Horn, 1978). Secondary and tertiary higher education was 
used to assess crystallized learning as a function of knowledge. This can also 
indicate OSINT engaged with in a familiar context that does not necessarily cross 
disciplinary lines. A careful comparative analysis of the concepts, operational 
concepts, dimensions, and data distinguishing crystallized intelligence from fluid 
intelligence was conducted using the Periploko Method.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESULTS 
 
The following sections use adaptive capacity, collaboration, scale, 
knowledge, and learning to reveal patterns and trends that helped establish any 
possible correlation between fluid intelligence (learning, scale, and collaboration) 
and adaptive governance (adaptive capacity) in gulf monarchies in the Middle 
East. The research was divided into five phases. The first phase included a 
categorization by monarchical type. The second included a more granular 
assessment of patterns and trends independent of monarchy type, including 
relationships between ICT usage (learning) and higher education enrollment 
(knowledge). The third examined links between adaptive governance and fluid 
intelligence mediating between strength of governance, fluid intelligence, and 
social capital (collaboration) using the Periploko Method. The fourth phase 
analyzed the distinctions between adaptive governance and fluid intelligence 
between the most adaptive and most non-adaptive regime, integrating interest 
groups as a mediator. Finally, the fifth phase, the final analysis, included a 
comparison of virtual social network engagement (learning), social capital 
(collaboration), and scale (internet usage) between the most adaptive and non-
adaptive states to determine the impact of fluid intelligence and governance on 
stability (indicated by group grievance) in the Middle East. 
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Phase 1: Comparative Analysis by Monarchy Type 
Each monarchy was first categorized by type: absolute, constitutional, or 
federation. Next, a comparative analysis of concepts (adaptive capacity, 
collaboration, scale, knowledge, and learning) was conducted across diverse 
datasets. Then, each group was analyzed and differences were noted in the 
interpretation of each dataset’s scales along with consistent patterns and trends. 
Absolute Monarchies 
Three nations were classed as absolute monarchies: the Sultanate of 
Oman, the State of Qatar, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  Oman led in 
political and social integration from 2008-2012, but Qatar managed to overtake 
all three absolute monarchies from 2014. Saudi Arabia has remained consistently 
very low in political and social integration throughout the time frame of the study. 
All three monarchies have much lower than average levels of political and social 
integration on a scale of 1-10. All three monarchies have experienced above 
average levels of ICT engagement. 
Constitutional Monarchies 
Two states in this sample are constitutional monarchies—The Kingdom of 
Bahrain and the State of Kuwait. Bahrain maintained consistent secondary and 
tertiary education enrollment over the course of the study, whereas Kuwait 
experienced an increase of about 10%. Kuwait and Bahrain experienced 
consistent and gradual increases in virtual social network usage, and both states 
had 14% or less of maximum ICT usage. 
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Federation of Monarchies 
The UAE, the only federal monarchy in the study, exhibited constant low 
political and social integration from 2008-2016. However, its social capital has 
increased by 20% to 6 out of 10; an above average rating. Over the past 10 
years, the UAE has maintained an average internet usage above 85%, with a 
population permeation above 90% in 2016. Secondary and tertiary education 
enrollment has remained consistent in the UAE, with a sudden spike in 2014. 
The UAE experienced the most substantial growth of all monarchies from 6.7 to 
8.6 (see Figure 5). After analyzing patterns and trends, no outstanding patterns 
across concepts (knowledge, learning, scale, collaboration, or adaptive capacity) 
were found to be specific to one type of monarchy. 
 
 
Figure 5. The United Arab Emirates fragile state data, 2007-2017. Source: FSI, 
2017 
 
Overall, this analysis discovered monarchies that shared more granular 
characteristics within a specific operational concept (e.g., similar levels of state 
legitimacy and human rights abuses under the operational concept, state 
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fragility). For instance, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain revealed a consistent 
combination of political (human rights, state legitimacy) and cohesion (group 
grievance measures) above 7 throughout the study period. The UAE has shown 
a consistent decline in group grievance with a score of 3.1: the lowest of all 
monarchies examined in the Gulf. In terms of more specific data representative 
of state frailty, all the gulf monarchies were consistently most fragile in human 
rights and state legitimacy over the scope of the study (see Figure 6).   
 
 
Figure 6. A comparison of state legitimacy and human rights in the gulf 
monarchies. Source: FSI, 2017 (averages of state legitimacy and human rights 
between 2010 and 2016) on a scale of 1-10 (1 best and 10 worst) 
 
Phase 2: A More Granular Assessment of Patterns and Trends 
After taking note of consistent patterns and trends by monarchy, states 
were identified that were adaptive or non-adaptive, as well as states representing 
consistencies in diverse combinations. In other words, operational concepts and 
data were analyzed in isolation or combinations that were consistent over time 
and grouped by state. Data that had a consistent impact on another set of data 
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(e.g., outcomes congruent with changing patterns and trends) were noted and 
considered. Process tracing was employed until states that shared similar 
characteristics, strengths, and weaknesses were identified. 
Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE led in internet usage between the three GCC 
countries throughout the scope of the study. These countries also experienced 
incremental increases in virtual social network or ICT usage between 2010 and 
2016, with Bahrain at 6.5 on a scale of 1-7 (see Figure 7). 
 
 
Figure 7. Virtual network engagement in Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab 
Emirates, 2010-2016. Source: Knoema and NRI, 2017 
 
Bahrain and Saudi Arabia had consistently above average levels of 
secondary and tertiary enrollment, with an average of about 6 on a scale of 1-7 
(See Figure 8). 
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Figure 8. Higher education enrollment in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, 2010-2016. 
Source: Knoema and BTI, 2018 
 
Saudi Arabia had the most balanced engagement between ICT and higher 
education, whereas Qatar substantially succeeded higher education levels with 
ICT engagement in 2010. In 2016, Saudi Arabia had almost equal levels of 
secondary and tertiary education enrollment and virtual social network usage, 
whereas in the UAE, virtual social network usage dominated (see Figures 9 and 
10). 
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Figure 9. Comparison of information and communication technologies usage, 
higher education and training in the Gulf: Scores in 2010. Source: BTI, 2017 
 
 
Figure 10. Comparison of information and communication technologies usage, 
higher education and training in the Gulf: Scores in 2016. Source: BTI, 2017 
 
Phase 3: The Periploko Method 
Integrating all data using the Periploko Method permitted comparison 
between 2010 and 2016. States were categorized on a scale of 1-3: 1 meaning 
good or high engagement, 2 meaning moderate or moderate engagement, and 3 
meaning poor or weak engagement based on scores from 2010 (1 year before 
the Arab Spring) and 2016 (5 years after). This technique was developed to 
standardize data drawn from diverse datasets into one scale that would allow me 
to more easily compare operational concepts and granular data within and 
between sets and group them into meaningful combinations with greater ease. 
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The method was also designed to measure interactions through pattern 
recognition (see Tables 1 and 2).  
ICT usage and quantity of education indicators were evaluated on a scale 
of 1-7 as opposed to the other indicators, which used a scale of 1-10. Those 
indicators were adjusted to my 1-3 scale by dividing each score by .7, adding 
30% to the score to make them congruent with the rest. State frailty measures 
were adjusted to represent adaptive or non-adaptive regimes using the same 1-3 
scale (1 representing the most adaptive regimes).  
States were scored on each measure, then grouped by highest and lowest 
score in duos (e.g., the top two states in virtual network engagement would get a 
1, the next highest a 2, etc.). If three states had the same level of engagement 
based on the original dataset, each would get the same score. After scores were 
calculated across operational concepts and data, they were put in a table by 
country categorized by adaptive governance, fluid intelligence, and crystallized 
intelligence for greater ease of understanding. 
Among Qatar, the UAE, and Bahrain, Qatar had the lowest levels of 
crystallized intelligence, whereas in 2016 the UAE had the lowest levels. These 
two countries were also the most stable and adaptive. Bahrain had the highest 
levels of crystallized intelligence within its population in 2010 and 2016, yet was 
the most unstable. This indicates that crystallized intelligence does not 
necessarily contribute to stability or may even play a part in higher group 
grievance among Middle Eastern gulf monarchies. All three countries analyzed 
had high levels of fluid intelligence. 
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Table 1 
Data and Periploko Scores for Gulf Monarchies by Adaptive Governance, Fluid Intelligence and Crystallized 
intelligence in 2010 
 
 
Table 2 
Data and Periploko Scores for Gulf Monarchies by Adaptive Governance, Fluid Intelligence and Crystallized 
intelligence in 2016 
 
Note. AC = Adaptive capacity; C = Collaboration (C2 and C3 are other data representing collaboration); S = Scale; 
L = Learning; K = Knowledge  
 
 
Country Adaptive Capacity P1-AC AC2-Stability P1A-S Collaboration 2 P3-C2 Collaboration P4 Scale P5-S Learning P6-L Knowledge P7-K
Adaptive Governance Fluid Intelligence Crystalized Intelligence
State Fragility Group Grievance Social Capital Interest Groups Internet Virtual Network Usage Secondary and Tertiary
Qatar 51.8 1 5.2 1 2.0 3 3.0 2 69 1 8.7 1 5.8 3
United Arab Emirates 52.4 2 4.7 2 5.0 1 3.0 2 68 1 8.4 1 6.5 2
Bahrain 58.8 2 6.5 3 6.0 1 6.0 1 55 2 8.4 1 6.8 1
Country Adaptive Capacity P1-AC AC2-Stability P1A-S Collaboration 2 P3-C2 Collaboration P4 Scale P5-S Learning P6-L Knowledge P7-K
` Adaptive Governance Fluid Intelligence Crystalized Intelligence
State Fragility Group Grievance Social Capital Interest Groups Internet Virtual Network Usage Secondary and Tertiary
Qatar 45.1 1 4.6 2 4.0 2 3.0 2 94 1 9.0 1 7.4 1
United Arab Emirates 44.5 1 3.6 1 6.0 1 2 3 91 2 9.3 1 6.3 3
Bahrain 63.4 3 7.9 3 3.0 2 6.0 1 98 1 9.0 1 7.2 2
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In the next analysis, variables are grouped by level of adaptivity (see 
Tables 3 and 4). Oman and Qatar were most adaptive in 2010, whereas Qatar 
and the UAE were most adaptive in 2016. Keeping these two most adaptive 
regimes, fluid intelligence and crystallized intelligence components were 
analyzed further. Crystallized intelligence was variable, and political and social 
integration was also variable and extremely low (at or below 3 on a scale of 1-10) 
among all monarchies, so I eliminated them from further analysis.  
 
Table 3 
Periploko Scores by Degree of Adaptivity: Scores in 2010 
 
Source: FSI, BTI, WEF and ITU; Periploko categorization of variables, indicators 
and criterion based on individual and clustered results.1 = good or highly 
engaged, 2 = moderate or marginally engaged, and 3 = poor or weakly engaged. 
  
Table 4 
Periploko Scores by Degree of Adaptivity: Scores in 2016 
 
Source: FSI, BTI, WEF and ITU; Periploko categorization of variables, indicators 
and criterion based on individual and clustered results.1 = good or highly 
engaged, 2 = moderate or marginally engaged, and 3 = poor or weakly engaged. 
Country Adaptive Capacity Collaboration Scale Learning Knowledge
Oman 1 2 3 3 2
Qatar 1 3 1 1 1
Bahrain 2 1 2 1 1
United Arab Emirates 2 1 1 1 1
Kuwait 3 2 2 2 2
Saudi Arabia 3 3 3 3 1
Country Adaptive Capacity Collaboration Scale Learning Knowledge
Qatar 1 2 1 1 3
United Arab Emirates 1 1 2 1 3
Kuwait 2 1 2 2 2
Oman 2 3 3 3 2
Bahrain 3 2 1 1 2
Saudi Arabia 3 3 3 2 1
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Two tables were then created that included only measures from the most 
adaptive and non-adaptive states, including social capital as a measure of 
collaboration under fluid intelligence in 2010 and 2016. According to the BTI, 
social capital means “solidarity and trust among citizens and social self-
organization based on cultural, environmental and social associations” (BTI, 
2017, p. 24) It was highly appropriate to test this data in the context of the other 
fluid intelligence variables to assess its impact. In Tables 5 and 6, the most 
adaptive and non-adaptive states are highlighted in the context of social capital, 
internet, and ICT for further analysis. 
Table 5 
Comparison of Adaptive Governance and Fluid Intelligence: Scores in 2010 
 
 
Table 6 
Comparison of Adaptive Governance and Fluid Intelligence: Scores in 2016 
 
 
Qatar and Oman were most adaptive in 2010, whereas Qatar and the 
UAE were most adaptive in 2016 (See Figures 11 and 12). Kuwait and Saudi 
Country Adaptive Capacity Collaboration Scale Learning Knowledge
Qatar 1 3 1 1 2
Oman 1 2 3 3 3
Kuwait 3 2 2 2 2
Saudi Arabia 3 3 3 3 3
Country Adaptive Capacity Collaboration Scale Learning Knowledge
Qatar 1 2 1 1 3
United Arab Emirates 1 1 2 1 3
Bahrain 3 2 1 1 2
Saudi Arabia 3 3 3 2 1
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Arabia were the most non-adaptive in 2010, whereas Bahrain and Saudi Arabia 
were most non-adaptive in 2016. Qatar had the same score in both years, 
maintaining the highest collective adaptivity and fluid intelligence of the sample. 
Saudi Arabia maintained the most non-adaptive status. It is also important to 
note that although Bahrain was one of the most non-adaptive nations in 2016, it 
had the highest fluid intelligence scores in the areas of social capital, internet, 
and virtual social network usage. 
 
Figure 11. Comparison of adaptive governance and fluid intelligence: Scores in 
2010. Note. Fluid intelligence includes social capital, the internet and ICT usage 
(1 = best or most engaged).  Source: FSI, BTI, WEF, NRI and ITU  
 
 
Figure 12. Comparison of adaptive governance and fluid intelligence: Scores in 
2016. Note. Fluid intelligence includes social capital, the internet and ICT usage 
(1 = best or most engaged).  Source: FSI, BTI, WEF, NRI and ITU 
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Bahrain had high levels of social capital in 2010, but experienced a 
dramatic drop in 2016, whereas Qatar experienced the most dramatic increase 
2016 (see Figures 13 and 14). Overall, the UAE had the highest social capital in 
2016. After noting these trends, Bahrain’s results were compared to Qatar in 
2010 and 2016. 
 
 
Figure 13. Comparison between Bahrain and Qatar: Scores in 2010. Source: 
FSI, BTI, WEF, NRI and ITU 
  
 
Figure 14. Comparison between Bahrain and Qatar: Scores in 2016. Source: 
FSI, BTI, WEF, NRI and ITU 
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 The most significant difference in variables between these two monarchies 
was degree of adaptive governance. Levels of fluid intelligence were high in both 
Qatar and Bahrain in 2010 and 2016. However, Qatar was twice as adaptive as 
Bahrain. 
Phase 4: Adaptive Governance and Fluid Intelligence 
In Phase 3, I created a table composed of states strong in adaptive 
governance and fluid intelligence (internet usage-scope, social capital-
collaboration, and ICT usage-learning) which include: states weak in adaptive 
governance and fluid intelligence; states weak in adaptive governance, but 
strong in fluid intelligence; and states strong in adaptive governance but weak in 
fluid intelligence, to assess any additional consistencies between the levels of 
government adaptivity (see Table 7). I found that fluid intelligence was extremely 
strong in the UAE (the second most adaptive regime) and Saudi Arabia (the most 
non-adaptive regime). 
 
Table 7 
Adaptive and Non-Adaptive Gulf Monarchies Compared with Fluid Intelligence 
Ranking  
Country Adaptive Capacity Learning/Scope 
 Strong Weak Strong/Moderate 
Qatar 1  1 
United Arab Emirates 1  1 
Bahrain  3 1 
Saudi Arabia  3 2 
Note. 1 = Best or highly engaged; 2 = Moderately or nominally engaged; and 3 = rarely 
or not engaged, 2010-2016. Saudi Arabia could be classified as a 1 in Learning as the 
measures between states were so narrow and all gulf monarchies are close to saturation 
53 
in virtual network engagement. Source: Periploko Method, based on data from FSI, the 
BTI, the ITU and World Economic Forum.  
 
Because of the high and consistent levels of fluid intelligence in Bahrain, 
Qatar, and the UAE compared to the radical drop in social capital (collaboration) 
in Bahrain and high levels of social capital in the UAE in 2016, it was necessary 
to examine another aspect of collaboration (under fluid intelligence) to examine 
any other influences that might give additional clues regarding the degree to 
which collaboration affects fluid intelligence and stability in the Middle East. 
Interest groups can affect collaboration between the government and the 
governed. A comparison between interest groups and social capital was chosen 
to assess any relationships between them.  
In addition, instead of just relying on a measure of state frailty, which 
includes an average of other data components, the state fragility index measure 
was disaggregated to include more granular data representative of group 
grievance, keeping state frailty as the independent variable and virtual social 
network usage moderated by social capital as indicators of fluid intelligence to 
further assess its degree of influence on group grievance (or instability) in gulf 
monarchies.  
Phase 5: Adaptive Governance, Fluid Intelligence and Stability 
In the last phase, interest groups were included from the concept of 
collaboration to assess its impact on fluid intelligence. It was necessary to 
determine how collaboration was best represented in monarchies as opposed to 
strictly democratic governing systems. Economic and non-economic interest 
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groups are high affinity networks that promote their interests to influence 
government decisions (Cliffs Notes, 2017). Figure 15 represents them both in the 
aggregate.  
 
Figure 15. Measures of interest group engagement in the United Arab Emirates, 
Kuwait, and Bahrain in 2016. Source: BTI. 
 
Bahrain and Kuwait consistently maintained the highest percentages of 
interest group activity over the course of the study while the UAE had the lowest. 
However, the UAE maintained the highest percentages of social capital, but its 
interest group engagement was moderate from 2012.  
It was interesting to note that although Bahrain and Kuwait share this 
special combination of high interest group engagement, Bahrain had experienced 
substantially higher levels of group grievance than Kuwait between 2010 and 
2016 (see Figures 16 and 17). However, Kuwait’s group grievance levels 
worsened between 2014 and 2017. The fact that the UAE and Qatar, the two 
most adaptive governments, had moderate interest group engagement indicates 
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that interest group engagement did not necessary play a key factor in 
maintaining stability in gulf monarchies. 
 
 
Figure 16. Interest group engagement in the Gulf Cooperation Council: Scores in 
2010. 
 
 
Figure 17. Interest group engagement in the Gulf Cooperation Council: Scores in 
2016. 
 
A comparison of interest group engagement between Bahrain, the UAE, 
and Qatar revealed that populations are and continue to be the most highly 
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engaged in Bahrain (see Figures 18 and 19). Group grievance rates are equally 
high. However, in the UAE, interest group engagement decreased significantly by 
50% between 2010 and 2016, with group grievance at an all-time low.  
 
 
 
Figure 18. Influence of information and communication technologies, interest 
groups, and social capital on group grievance: Scores in 2010. Source: FST, BTI, 
and WEF Global Competitive Index. 
 
 
 
Figure 19. Influence of information and communication technologies, interest 
groups, and social capital on group grievance: Scores in 2016. Source: FST, BTI, 
and WEF Global Competitive Index. 
 
Bahrain and the UAE scored highest in three capacities in 2016 (see 
Figure 20). In both 2010 and 2016, the UAE scored highest in collaboration, 
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social capital, and learning. Bahrain was the most non-adaptive monarchy in 
2016, yet scored highest in scope, learning, and knowledge. Saudi Arabia was 
the next non-adaptive monarchical system, but scored among the highest in 
knowledge.  
Bahrain had significantly higher levels of group grievance than the UAE in 
2010 and increased those levels to the highest of all gulf monarchies. Levels of 
group grievance in the UAE decreased, but learning and social capital were high 
in the nation in 2010. Bahrain had very high scores in learning, but was 
significantly lower in social capital (collaboration) in 2016. Qatar, Kuwait, and the 
UAE had high scores in learning and social capital (Qatar experienced the most 
significant increase in social capital [by 50%] from 2010 to 2016). The similarities 
in levels of collaboration (social capital), scope, and learning compared to lower 
levels of group grievance among adaptive monarchical regimes are highly 
significant in that they reveal a moderate correlation between fluid intelligence 
and stability in adaptive regimes.  
 
 
Figure 20. Final analysis of adaptive and non-adaptive regimes comparing 
stability (group grievance), fluid intelligence (social capital, internet usage and 
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virtual social network usage) and crystallized intelligence (higher education), 
2016. 
 
Overall, Bahrain (one of the least adaptive or most non-adaptive 
monarchies) experienced a significant increase in group grievance and a 
dramatic decrease in social capital from 2012 to 2016.  The UAE (the most 
adaptive monarchy overall) experienced a marked decrease in group grievance 
since 2010 and earned one of the lowest fragile state index scores of all 
monarchies. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DISCUSSION 
 
The question I sought to answer was whether fluid intelligence through 
ICT and OSINT engagement in civilian populations influenced the stability of gulf 
monarchies in the Middle East. I used an interdisciplinary approach that included 
comparative case study analysis, process tracing, and the Periploko Method to 
develop a typology that measured patterns and trends to reveal distinctions, 
correlations, and insights about the data in context.  The datasets were drawn 
from the FSI, the BTI, the ITU, the World Economic Forum Global 
Competitiveness Report, and the World Economic Forum Network Readiness 
Index.   
Summary of Case Studies 
Steinberg (2014) asserted that the Kingdoms of Saudi Arabia and 
Bahrain’s most pressing threat is the influence of Shiite groups within their 
populations who have experienced discrimination and marginalization to a large 
degree in both states; however, the majority of those in protest desire regime 
change as opposed to reform to support a higher quality of life and are supported 
by the state of Iran in that endeavor. Uprisings in these states (including the 
Pearl or February 14th Revolution in Bahrain) were a continuance of a 
fundamental and ongoing challenge of curbing the influence of Shia ideologies in 
these gulf monarchical regimes. 
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The state of Qatar has also experienced pushback from their civilian 
populations due to “domestic discontent against the ruling family’s economic and 
social policies” (Razavi, 2018, para. 6). The state has also experienced 
contention from its fellow gulf monarchical leaders because of their alleged 
support for the Islamist group, the Muslim Brotherhood. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, 
Oman, and the UAE have expressed their discontent with Qatar’s business 
relationship (shared natural gas resources) with the Iranian leadership and 
alleged ties to extremist groups through blockades and the withdrawal of 
diplomatic representatives (Hansen, 2017).  
Although little is found in the media about activities that take place in 
Oman, the sultanate has had its share of Arab Spring incidents due to a 
“neglected political reform process;” divisions within Omani society (especially 
amongst the Indians and Pakistani people); high food prices; low teacher wages; 
and corruption (Worrall, 2018, para. 1). Expressions of grievance included social 
media mobilizations like the chatroom, Sablat al Arab, peaceful sit-ins in Muscat 
at the Shura council, and the Green Marches, where demonstrators expressed 
admiration and loyalty for the sultan, but wanted to expose the uncanny practices 
of merchants and other officials who sought to take advantage of the sultan’s 
generosity and ignorance of systemic loopholes in commerce and economy 
(Worrall, 2018). 
The State of Kuwait has the most open parliamentary system of all 
monarchies and contends with population unrest, mainly in politics. The biggest 
problem has been the influence of Islamist groups on youth populations and their 
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subsequent popularity as elected bodies (Bandow, 2012). According to Bandow 
(2012), “70% of the population is under 29” (para. 14) and the Islamist groups 
have been adept at identifying the overlooked needs of youth populations and 
exploiting them for their benefit (Bandow, 2012). According to Bandow, because 
of an Islamic group getting elected into power, the emir changed the electoral 
system to avoid the introduction of radical beliefs and practices, which resulted in 
population protest. The overall sentiment in Kuwait is loyalty to their leader, but 
the people desire more control over the decision-making process. The population 
in Kuwait has the Gulf’s “oldest elected parliament, most free media and greatest 
religious liberty” (para. 2); however, these liberties came at the expense of 
fundamentalist groups who sought to deceptively undermine them by 
manipulating the vulnerable youth population (Bandow, 2012). 
The UAE was the only gulf monarchy that avoided any uprisings during 
the Arab Spring, though some argue this was due to “state sponsored repression 
of human rights, advocates and journalists” and legislation that prohibits the 
expression of dissention or discontent against the state (Abrougi, 2016, para. 2). 
This is true for both non-permanent residents and citizens. Despite limitations on 
free expression and privacy, the population enjoys one of the highest prosperity 
indexes in the world, which reveals a high quality of life (Abrougi, 2016). 
In all these cases (with the exception of the UAE), a huge gap between 
the people’s expectations and what they experienced from their governing 
systems was inherent in different contexts. In many instances, the gap became 
so wide that the people effectively reached a threshold that drove them to take 
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radical action to narrow or close that gap. “Although they shared a common call 
for personal dignity and responsive government, the revolutions…reflected 
divergent economic grievances and social dynamics” (Anderson, 2011, p. 2). The 
fruit of the ideologies and worldviews they shared resulted in a panoply of 
ungoverned spaces, economic hardships, and negative views of the United 
States (Clapper, 2013) and other western countries that continue to be projected 
on the international platform, frequently resulting in global incidents of violent 
extremism (Bolden, 2017). These events have often stemmed from or been 
inspired by non-state actors with origins in several key Middle Eastern states. 
Indicators of instability continue to play out in neighboring countries. The study 
revealed that fluid intelligence in adaptive regimes promotes stability in gulf 
monarchies. It also suggested that fluid intelligence in non-adaptive regimes can 
result in higher levels of group grievance that lead to instability and discontent. 
The analysis of data from diverse sources revealed that all monarchies in 
the sample scored high in state legitimacy (were perceived by their populations 
as illegitimate) and high levels of human rights abuse, but exhibited variable 
levels of group grievance (the more adaptive the regime, the lower the group 
grievance). These results contradict the earlier assumptions that stability was 
necessarily based on state legitimacy and social contracts that satisfy the basic 
needs of the populations they serve. This research study also revealed that most 
states in the Gulf have high fluid intelligence capacities.  
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain were the most non-adaptive regimes, whereas 
Qatar and the UAE were the most adaptive. Bahrain and the UAE had the same 
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levels of fluid intelligence; however, Bahrain had high group grievance whereas 
the UAE had the lowest of all gulf monarchies. Bahrain had exceptionally high 
levels of social capital in the years preceding the Arab Spring, but dropped 
dramatically from 2011 to 2016. This could indicate subjugation tactics that have 
undermined trust within the population; increasing the discontent of 
disempowered groups in Bahrain, leaving them vulnerable to explore other 
dysfunctional ways to meet unmet needs. Governance is a key factor in 
maintaining a healthy balance between the government and the governed in 
ways that meet quality of life expectations and progressive reform. 
Governance is influenced by a number of factors, but most fundamentally, 
the nature and approach of governance play a part in power structures that 
determine how decisions are made, how laws and legislation are created, and 
the degree of influence a population has on the overall process. It also 
determines how laws and legislation are implemented to keep the peace, 
promote economic growth, and meet the needs of the governed. The first phase 
of my research sought to examine the influence of monarchy type on fluid 
intelligence and adaptive governance in the Middle East. After having conducted 
the analysis, I did not notice any consistencies by type (e.g., absolute, 
constitutional, or federation), but I did notice that all six monarchies scored high 
in human rights abuses and frailty in state legitimacy. 
Although all monarchies scored high in human rights abuses and state 
legitimacy, these indicators were not sufficient to address questions of adaptive 
governance proper, as these are systemic and chronic cultural and institutional 
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areas of vulnerability that would not necessarily reveal any distinctions in impact 
within and between capacities. However, the fact that monarchies are autocratic 
by nature can shed light on limitations in the area of human rights, state 
legitimacy, and government power monopolies within the system. It is also worth 
noting that human rights are broadly defined and each country exploits different 
aspects of human rights in different ways to its own advantage. Some 
exploitations are more heinous than others.  
Human rights abuses that gradually worsen over time combined with 
group grievance decreasing over time can suggest that strategies of subjugation 
work to maintain stability for the majority of the population, but what about the 
outliers? What about the growing number of emergent phenomena manifested in 
the form of extremist group incidents and intermittent, but more frequent, 
occurrences of protests that have affected both the Middle Eastern region and 
international community? 
Legitimacy is a criterion of a population’s confidence in the government. It 
indicates degrees of corruption, transparency, and the quality of electoral 
systems evidenced by demonstrations, protests, or extremist activity in the region 
(Fragile States Index Methodology, 2018). State legitimacy can be abused easily 
where there are power monopolies. Human rights and the problems that result 
from poor state legitimacy often go hand in hand. For instance, low levels of 
group grievance and high levels of human rights abuses may indicate a level of 
tolerance or conditioned fear response to non-adaptive strategies, which can 
result in emergent instances of extremist activity, sleeping giants on the brink, or 
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healthy adaptive strategies from the civilian population that lead to incremental 
reform. It would depend on the nature of the human rights offense by the non-
adaptive state and the population’s ability to adapt (measured by levels of fluid 
intelligence) to maintain threshold quality of life expectations. A further study into 
human rights proper, the nature and degree of human rights abuse in each 
respective state as it pertains to monarchies, adaptive governance and the 
population-at-large, and the quality of monarchical governance (e.g., 
transparency or corruption) would provide more context to the overall body of 
research. 
In the second phase of the study, I examined unique combinations 
between factors between 2010 and 2016 and grouped them by monarchy using a 
unique Periploko method designed to measure combinations and interactions 
between data. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain shared similar combinations in the 
areas of group grievance, human rights abuse, and state legitimacy fragility. 
They also led in secondary and tertiary enrollment (e.g., crystallized intelligence 
or knowledge). This might indicate that crystallized intelligence does not 
necessarily play a dominant role in maintaining stability, as both countries have 
experienced more population unrest and extremist activity than any of the other 
regimes.  
Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE had the highest levels of internet (scale) and 
virtual social network usage (learning) among all monarchies. The combination of 
knowledge and learning in Bahrain could be significant in that the population 
could have higher quality of life expectations that can lead to greater volatility 
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within the state. Knowledge alone could be dormant, but the interaction between 
knowledge and learning, an emergent outcome that fuels higher levels of 
grievance and instability. Qatar and the UAE have maintained the lowest group 
grievance levels in the Gulf. 
In 2016, Qatar and the UAE had the highest levels of adaptive capacity 
(lowest in state fragility) and learning. Qatar and Bahrain shared had the same 
scores in learning, scale, and collaboration. Learning, scale, and collaboration 
are indicative of high levels of fluid intelligence, and moderate to high scores in 
collaboration could indicate a greater level of community engagement that could 
positively affect reform or protest.  
Next, I identified the two most adaptive and non-adaptive monarchies of 
the six nations analyzed using the Periploko method. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain 
were the most non-adaptive, whereas Qatar and the UAE were the most 
adaptive. Qatar, the UAE, and Bahrain scored high in fluid intelligence, whereas 
Saudi Arabia had above average levels. This trend revealed that both non-
adaptive and adaptive monarchies had equal levels of above average fluid 
intelligence based on virtual social network engagement and internet usage. At 
this point, it was still not clear to how or to what degree fluid intelligence impacted 
stability, or if this ability had any influence at all.  
After that, I added the mediator of interest groups from the operational 
concept of political and social integration to measure its impact on fluid 
intelligence. Bahrain and Kuwait had the highest levels of interest group 
engagement throughout the study. Both Bahrain and the UAE had high levels of 
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social capital, but the UAE increased between 2010 and 2016, whereas 
Bahrain’s decreased dramatically. Kuwait experienced instability in 2014 as 
evidenced in its group grievance scores, but levels of social capital were 
moderate throughout the study.   
High levels of interest group and social capital can indicate populations 
that are more collaborative with governing systems. This conclusion would 
depend on the type of interest group (economic or non-economic) and the 
influence of social capital on the decision-making process. In the case of the 
UAE, social capital and adaptive governance would reinforce one another. 
However, in Bahrain, non-adaptive governance combined with high social capital 
and interest group engagement would decrease population trust. The extent of 
that decrease would depend on the nature of the governance (e.g., type of 
human rights abuses) instigating grievance. 
High interest group engagement and low social capital could reveal the 
dominant influence of economic interest groups, as social capital represents the 
interests of the greater population. Low interest group and high social capital, as 
is the case with the UAE, could indicate community engagement with other 
mechanisms within the government that promote the population’s greater 
interests. It could also reveal the presence of non-economic interest groups, 
which are not as ubiquitous as the economic networks. Further research that 
analyzed the aggregate components of interest groups would be necessary to 
substantiate those distinctions. It is important to note that the interest group 
component was analyzed in isolation during the last phase of research, but 
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showed a significant characteristic (high levels of interest group engagement in 
Kuwait and Bahrain) that may be the result of the parliamentary design of 
constitutional monarchies (which was not apparent in the first phase of research, 
as interest groups were analyzed last). 
In the final phase, I chose group grievance as an official measure of 
stability in the Middle East based on my process tracing analysis and Periploko 
method. I also chose state fragility as the independent variable, virtual social 
network engagement as a measure of learning, and social capital as a measure 
of collaboration. Bahrain, a non-adaptive monarchy, scored high in both learning 
and collaboration in 2010, but experienced a dramatic drop in collaboration over 
the course of the study (about 50%). The UAE, an adaptive monarchy, scored 
high in collaboration, scope and learning.  
Bahrain experienced massive protests during the Arab Spring in 2011, as 
group grievance and human rights abuses have been on the rise. The UAE, 
although also moderately high in the area of human rights abuses, earned the 
second lowest group grievance scores (next only to Oman) and has moved 
forward with progressive reform in the region, with no incidents of population 
unrest or international extremist activities between 2010 and 2016, indicating 
stability within the regime. 
The research study revealed a strong correlation between adaptive 
regimes with fluid populations and stability. States high in fluid intelligence in 
adaptive regimes have lower group grievance, but states high in fluid intelligence 
in non-adaptive regimes have higher group grievance. Social capital or 
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collaboration reveals an effective use of fluidity within groups as opposed to 
individuals. A more thorough analysis of the impact of social capital on fluid 
intelligence through social network analysis, surveys of the population, policy and 
consensus mechanisms, and the nature of human rights abuses would make the 
support of causality between adaptive governance, fluid intelligence, and stability 
more comprehensive. 
Outliers and Other Inconsistencies 
Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE revealed some outliers and inconsistencies 
throughout the study. Despite gradual improvement, in 2014 Kuwait experienced 
a drastic worsening of state legitimacy that has never drastically improved. This 
spike occurred during the Kuwait protests and at the dawn of the Arab Spring 
revolts. However, despite the population’s disappointment with the governing 
system then and now, the population has still managed to contain its discontent. 
In 2010, Kuwait had one of the worst levels of overall state fragility, but drastically 
improved in 2018, with one of the highest levels of social capital in 2016. The 
state has also maintained a majority of below average group grievance scores 
between 2007 and 2017. Qatar has been one of the most adaptive regimes 
between 2010 and 2016, with the one of the highest levels of social capital, 
scope, learning, and knowledge of all the gulf monarchies. 
However, in 2014, the monarchy experienced a drastic worsening of 
overall state fragility. This outlier was most likely due to the external interventions 
that took place among Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE against Qatar based 
on allegations of supporting terrorist organizations and perceived common 
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adversaries in the Middle East. This occurred again in 2017, but Qatar still 
managed to keep state fragility at an all-time low. However, the effects of the 
intervention doubled their negative impact in 2018. The 2014 and 2018 measures 
of state fragility and some of the other consequences Qatar has experienced due 
to external intervention highlights its power over adaptive governance. The 
powerful influence of external intervention on adaptive and non-adaptive regimes 
should be included in future studies to add substantially to this body of research 
(see Figure 21). 
 
 
Figure 21. State fragility in Qatar, 2010-2017. Source: Fragile States Index. 
 
 The UAE experienced a huge spike in secondary and tertiary enrollments 
in 2014 (see Figure 22). This anomaly could be attributed to a sudden increase in 
enrollment following a launch of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) initiative Education for All or an increased 
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enrollment of expatriates and nationals in K-12 and tertiary education due to a 
rise in demand for quality education and educators in the UAE from expatriates.  
 
 
Figure 22. Quantity of education in the United Arab Emirates, 2007-2016 (on a 
scale of 1-10). Source: World Economic Forum, Global Competitive Index 
Limitations 
I encountered several limitations throughout the course of the study. 
These included Periploko scale disparities, inconsistent data availability and time 
ranges across monarchies, dataset bias, inconsistent disaggregate data 
availability (e.g., interest groups did not have economic and non-economic data 
type data), and representative demographic data within the FSI. 
The score differences between states in a certain Periploko category (e.g., 
score 1 or score 2 could have a difference of 20% between them, which is 
significant) were extreme. The scores were based on relative levels between 
monarchies and the Periploko scale used was very narrow (1-3). Exact scores 
were illustrated in previous tables and graphs throughout the study. However, 
widening the scale to 1.0-5.0 would yield more granular results. 
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First, data for the gulf monarchy regimes were variable. Some datasets 
representing certain categories started or ended earlier than others (e.g., Internet 
Usage for gulf monarchies started in 2000 whereas the fragile state index started 
in 2007). To adjust for missing data and incongruent start/end times, I chose a 
range that included data in each category for all gulf monarchies (2010-2016). 
Although I took note of patterns in trends in the data across 7 years and 
consideration of patterns before 2010 based on data availability, the Periploko 
typology was based on a comparative analysis of trends across categories 1 year 
before the Arab Spring (2011) and 5 years after. This context provided insight 
into indicators before the protests and how they evolved. 
It is also important to note that each dataset used to develop the master 
dataset was created from a certain perspective. The Fund for Peace developed 
the Fragile Index. The World Economic Forum calculated the ICT usage and 
Higher Education enrollment scores to compile a global competitiveness report. 
ITU is a UN body that works very closely with the private sector to evaluate and 
sell products related to internet and ICT usage to the public and private sector. 
The BTI was the fruit of a German-based project with the goal of assessing 
democratic status and management in a selected group of countries 
internationally.  
All datasets will necessary be biased to accommodate the frameworks 
from which they were developed.  For example, the Global Competitiveness 
Index “defines competitiveness as the set of institutions, polices and factors that 
determine the level of productivity in the country” (Cann, 2016, para. 1). This 
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framework associated with state productivity is necessarily reflected in the 
variables, indicators, and criteria. In other words, the meaning of a specific 
concept or variable in social network analysis can mean something completely 
different in natural resource management, even though the same word is used.  
For instance, BTI’s (2017) definition of social capital was more reflective of 
decentralized and autonomous social groups sharing common cultural, 
economic, and political preferences. This meaning is the exact opposite of social 
capital proper in social network analysis (SNA), as social affiliated groups are 
highly cohesive and groups high in social capital in an SNA context have 
numerous diverse ties to individuals who are not necessarily a part of their inner 
circle. Even though these meanings contradict each other, analyzing the nature 
of social networks in form and function is essential to understanding how groups 
decentralize; the role of social capital proper in advancing the interests of these 
decentralized, autonomous groups; how these identity networks influence fluid 
intelligence and the implementation of group interests; and what these networks 
can reveal about group grievance and healthy, thriving communities from the 
bottom up. 
BTI also has a conflict intensity indicator that is used in the same way as 
group grievance in FSI, but the grievance described is based on social, ethnic, or 
religious differences as opposed to differences between the population and the 
state. These distinctions were made in the methods section, but in order for the 
diverse datasets to be integrated in such a way that served the needs of the 
research study, it was necessary for me to disaggregate the data into various 
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levels and pick those aspects of the dataset most relevant to my sample. 
Consequently, I needed to create my own dataset using categories, variables, 
indicators, and criteria from the five datasets to answer the research question. 
It is also important to mention that only three out of five of the categories 
had representative dimensions (more granular level data). Sometimes 
disaggregation is not needed when variables are sufficiently representative in the 
context of the research study and dataset. However, in the case that a piece of 
data needs to be disaggregated, it would be wise to find another dataset that 
includes data more congruent with the sample and research question. 
Demographic considerations were also a substantial limitation, as most 
monarchies have very large expatriate populations (see Figure 23). What role (if 
any) do expatriates have in governance? Qatar has a citizen population of 14%; the 
rest are expatriates with various degrees of responsibility and privilege within the 
state. The composition of the expatriate population must also be analyzed to obtain 
a realistic perspective of inter population and state/population’s impact on 
governance. 
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Figure 23. State comparison of citizens and expats in gulf monarchies, 2017. 
 
Finally, usage does not indicate utility. Internet or ICT usage does not 
indicate whether individuals are engaging them in ways that effectively cultivate 
fluid intelligence (e.g., watching movies or Skyping friends as opposed to 
conducting research or engaging with groups about sustainable development). 
Implications 
Learning and knowledge are intangible, yet have an increasing influence 
on how global populations perceive themselves and others. ICT and OSINT are 
changing the way people adapt to uncertain conditions, solve problems, and 
innovate for the greater good. These evolving paradigms are changing the 
calculus of how adaptive monarchies approach social, cultural, institutional, 
economic, and international challenges to sovereignty, leadership and 
progressive reform. Based on this research study, the UAE and Qatar were the 
most adaptive monarchies across capacities over the length of the study. They 
both revealed record levels of ICT usage and social capital in 2016: the strongest 
indicator of fluid intelligence. Bahrain was one of the most non-adaptive regimes, 
almost equally high in fluid intelligence, but highest in group grievance. Saudi 
Arabia was second in non-adaptivity with a high group grievance, but made the 
most substantial improvements over the course of the study in adaptivity (state 
fragility) from 2010-2016. 
Fluid intelligence is an ability that gives individuals and groups the 
capacity to think critically; tapping into their knowledge, skills, and abilities to 
make productive and meaningful contributions to their respective states and the 
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international community. It can also be used to destroy. Monarchical government 
strategies that emphasize entrepreneurship, sustainable development, 
community service, and population consensus could lead the way in innovation, 
healthy civil engagement, and economic growth in the Middle East. These 
activities increase social capital and rely on the contribution of the masses 
working together with the leadership, to prosper.  
Policy Recommendations 
All six of the gulf monarchies have created initiatives to address the 
expectation gap through community initiatives for women and youth, anti-
radicalism campaigns, employment opportunities, and infrastructure 
development. Some examples include the State of Qatar’s Global Community 
Engagement and Resilience Fund that promotes “social cohesion, community 
agency, equal access to opportunities and a sense of purpose” (G-CERF Fact 
Sheet, 2017, para. 2). Petroleum Development Oman (PDO) has recently agreed 
to support 18 initiatives in the Sultanate of Oman that promote “sustainable 
programs, community infrastructure, employability training, training and animal 
welfare” (Ona, 2018, para. 2). Lastly, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia rolled out their 
Vision 2030, led by the Council of Economic and Development Affairs, to address 
social, cultural, economic, and governance needs by creating more leadership 
opportunities for women, diversifying the economy, and cultivating a community 
of international acceptance while maintaining time honored religious and cultural 
traditions (Vision 2030, 2018). The UAE has integrated progressive reform as a 
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part of their regular policy for many years and continues to implement changes 
that strengthen their communities. 
There are several policy recommendations that I would propose that 
would complement already existing initiatives by promoting individual 
empowerment, adaptive governance, and sustainable communities that work 
symbiotically to promote abundance, security, and the longevity of monarchical 
regimes in the Middle East. These include: 
• the creation of democratic and human rights standards for monarchies 
that maintain order without compromising human dignity, 
• the creation of comprehensive models illustrating adaptive governance 
and non-adaptive governance based on a comprehensive research 
and development effort, 
• the creation of an independent research and development ministry 
made up of model citizens and members of the royal family to yearly 
assess the implementation of adaptive governance goals and 
objectives, 
• a comprehensive youth initiative that encourages innovative 
community development projects that provide a modest income and 
opportunities to participate in the decision-making process, and  
• an expatriate ministry designed to assess the needs of migrants and 
other non-permanent residents while integrating them into the 
sustainable development of the community at large. 
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Advancing the Research 
More comprehensive and granular research in human rights, social 
networks, power structures, social capital as defined by the BTI, and sustainable 
community development effectively support Middle Eastern policy and shape 
strategic governance. Other areas of specificity that would add to the research 
include a study of the impact of demography, including the compositional make-
up (e.g., faction analysis, religion, culture, ethnicity, gender and worldviews) and 
how these effect critical thinking, innovation, and governmental responsiveness. 
External intervention is another area that would be beneficial to explore, as 
international state power politics (neighboring adversarial states and proxy 
conflicts) often change the calculus and direction of regional priorities at the 
mercy of national interests.  
In addition, the development of current tools that assess civil engagement 
and environmental conditions that constrain progress in sustainable development 
of healthy, thriving communities (e.g., Civicus Enabling Environment Index [EEI] 
and the Civicus Civil Society Index) would be invaluable to monitor and evaluate 
the impact of governments and the governed throughout the world, resulting in 
the implementation of more effective and robust programs that help these 
governments and communities thrive. 
Another powerful research study would include an analysis of capacities to 
build sustainable communities and the potential for long-term implementation 
based on social capital and institutional structures that promote consensus, 
contribution, and individual empowerment in monarchical regimes. Other 
research questions to be considered include examining how monarchical leaders 
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monitor and evaluate the needs of the governed, what systems they use to 
address those needs, and how they course correct to improve both process and 
outcome. One can also find out if group grievance necessarily represents 
individual grievance. In complex systems, individual grievances can be indicative 
of low probability incidents with high impact: how could those be factored in the 
equation? 
Finally, the Periploko Method could be developed into a model and 
process that includes a more sophisticated typology in the form of a complex 
matrix driven by machine learning (deep neural networks), SNA and structural 
equation modeling. This matrix can be designed to identify causal interactions 
and emergent outcomes by scanning diverse datasets as well as interactions 
between nesting levels (international, national and communal) in diverse 
conceptual categories. This matrix (or collection of matrices) would support 
research and development efforts that inform security, adaptive governance and 
sustainable development in volatile regions around the world. 
A Paradigm Shift 
A paradigm shift in citizen value within monarchical regimes should take 
place, since populations are becoming more empowered as cognitive capacities 
adapt to accommodate the highly complex cultural, social, and technological 
landscape.  Literally and figuratively, each individual is tremendously valuable in 
terms of what he or she can contribute to the good of the regime, his or her 
society, and the international community. Truly recognizing citizen value and how 
to utilize it effectively to get the highest return on investment in such a way that 
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maximizes quality of life quotients, resources, regional, and international security 
and the longevity of the regime is the challenge that lays ahead of the gulf 
monarchies. Adaptive regimes in the Middle East have recognized the power of 
fluid intelligence supported by citizen social capital, technological advancement, 
consensus, and adaptive leadership in the 21st century. Strategies of intimidation 
are short-term and will only minimize the impact of fluid populations, fresh with 
new ideas and desperate for change. The alternative is disempowered civilian 
communities, more frequent emergent acts of violent extremist activity, and 
stagnant economies with little hope of progress.  
Recent efforts at reform within the gulf monarchies have been made in 
Saudi Arabia, previously categorized as one of the most non-adaptive regimes 
over the course of this study in the Middle East, to address inequality and civil 
oppression by recently appointed Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salmaan, which 
included allowing women to drive, giving females more access to education and 
business opportunities, and cracking down on corruption within its institutions. 
This populous and influential state is leading the way to instigate incremental 
change within a very diverse, ultra-conservative, and conflict prone region. With 
the evolution of cognitive adaptivity, the return on investment in each individual is 
tremendous for those who are willing and able to effectively cultivate and channel 
it toward the greater good. For better or for worse, ICT and OSINT have and will 
continue to contribute to individual empowerment, the advancement of the 
collective interests of civil society, and adaptive collaborative governments in the 
Middle East and beyond. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
 
Monarchies are, by nature, autocratic. If these regimes are to maintain 
their integrity in form and function, it has yet to be determined whether they will 
remain strictly autocratic, contributing to instability within the region and 
international platform, or autocratic with dominant democratic features that 
contribute to sustainable communities, democracy proper, and international 
security. Gulf monarchies driven by constitutional constructs are designed to give 
people a voice, but fear-based non-adaptive leadership renders them ineffective.  
True adaptive governing systems are made up of leaders who use adaptive 
leadership functioning within a system that gives voice to the governed in ways 
that support their quality of life expectations and cognitive adaptation constructs. 
Paradigms play an integral part in determining how individuals and groups 
see and respond to people, their environments, and governing systems. Middle 
Eastern monarchies differ from republics in myriad ways. Religious, cultural, 
tribal, and ethnic influences are woven throughout Arabic monarchical regimes. 
Democratic systems are not one size fits all. Individuals with a capacity to come 
up with novel ideas and adapt in diverse environments can be valuable partners 
in building innovative and sustainable communities that integrate democratic 
concepts in the context of a monarchy to which they can be proud to belong. The 
idea of a monarchy, and an absolute monarchy to be more specific, does not 
have to be intimidating in the 21st century. National pride, loyalty, and contribution 
83 
are the products of individual empowerment, critical thinking, a sense of personal 
ownership, and the freedom to belong. Conscious creation in a collaborative 
effort among citizens, monarchial governing officials, and the private sector can 
contribute to climates of growth, responsibility, hope, and transformation in 
service of adaptive monarchical governing systems in the Middle East. It is 
possible to provide citizens with democratic mechanisms to institutionalize 
consensus, promote civil engagement, and contribute to international security 
while keeping the form and function of the monarchy intact. Recognizing and 
cultivating citizen value will be the first step in transforming strategies of 
intimidation and fear to those of meaningful and constructive sustainable 
development that promotes long-term stability and thriving communities in Middle 
Eastern gulf monarchies. 
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